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Abstract
Majorities of citizens in high-income countries often oppose foreign
aid spending. One popular explanation is that the public overestimates
the percentage and amount of taxpayer funds that goes towards over-
seas aid. Can the framing of aid overcome this innumeracy? We report
the results of an experiment examining differences in support for aid
spending as a function of the information American and British respon-
dents receive about foreign aid spending. In both nations, providing
respondents with information about foreign aid spending as a percent-
age of the national budget significantly reduces support for cuts. The
findings suggest that support for aid can be increased, but significant
opposition to aid spending remains.
2
1 Introduction
NGOs and governments recognize that durable domestic support is a neces-
sary linchpin of a sustainable national foreign aid programme (Stern 1998;
International Development Committee 2009). Polls consistently show citi-
zen support for increasing their nation’s foreign aid outlays is low, but more
systematic research finds that the answers people provide is susceptible to
question framing and wording (Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson 2013). The
ways in which aid recipients are portrayed also affects the public’s generosity
and can stimulate paternalism (Baker 2015). A further reason citizens may
be reluctant to increase aid spending is that they over-estimate the percent-
age of the budget allocated to foreign aid (Gilens 2001). For example, both
Americans and British believe foreign aid constitutes a large portion of the
budget, 28% (Klein 2013) and 18% (vanHeerde-Hudson 2014) respectively.
The impact of citizens’ misperceptions of aid spending may be com-
pounded by innumeracy—the inability to process and deal with quantitative
information (Peters 2006). This problem is not unique to foreign aid. A re-
cent survey by Ipsos MORI (2015) shows the British public overestimate the
percentage of wealth owned by the top 1% at 59% (actual 23%); underesti-
mate the percentage of obese adults at 44% (actual 62%); and overestimate
the percentage of the population that are immigrants at 25% (actual 13%).
Innumeracy, or what Gigerenzer (2008) terms “collective statistical illiter-
acy”, includes the inability to understand risk, probabilities, or estimate the
size of sub-groups in society (e.g. African Americans, Jews, immigrants)
(Citrin and Sides 2008; Alba et al. 2005). In addition, Kahan et al. (2013)
show that innumeracy can itself be a function of directionally motivated
reasoning.
Previous research has demonstrated the consequences of misperceptions
(Gilens 2001; Kuklinski et al. 2000) and difficulties in correcting them (Ny-
han and Reifler 2010). We extend recent work on the consequences of po-
litical innumeracy (Mérola and Hitt 2015; Lawrence and Sides 2014) using
a framing experiment where we directly test the notion that large num-
bers that lie outside people’s everyday experience (millions and billions),
adversely affect support for foreign aid. More specifically we examine the
effect of presenting the foreign aid budget in absolute amounts versus as a
percent of the budget or both (see Figure 1). Our results show that present-
ing aid spending as a percent of the national budget reduces demand to cut
aid spending.
We examine the US and the UK because they are the largest donors in
the world, committing US$33.1bn and US$19.3bn respectively in official de-
velopment assistance (OECD 2016). The UK has doubled the proportion of
national income it spends on foreign aid to become only the seventh coun-
try to meet the long-standing UN target of spending 0.7% of GNI on aid
(Pearson 1969). The US is one of the least generous donors, sitting between
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Figure 1: Experimental Design: Factorial Presentation of Budget Numbers
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Estonia and Spain, spending just 0.19% of GNI.
2 Data, Survey, and Experimental Design
In February 2013, a matched quota sample of 1,010 British and 1,990 US
respondents received a YouGov online survey designed to measure individual
attitudes on a host of foreign and domestic policy issues. Respondents were
randomly to one of four treatment conditions:
• Baseline Condition (BC): Thinking about the amount of money
the British (US) government spends on overseas aid, do you think the
amount is too little, too much, or about right?
• Money Only (MO): Thinking about the 10.4 billion pounds (38
billion dollars) the British (US) government spends on overseas aid, do
you think this amount is too little, too much, or about right?
• Percent Only (PO): Thinking about the 0.7% (1%) of the budget
the British (US) government spends on overseas aid, do you think this
amount is too little, too much, or about right?
• Money and Percent (M&P): Thinking about the 10.4 billion pounds
(38 billion dollars)–or 0.7% (1%) of the budget–the British (US) gov-
ernment spends on overseas aid, do you think this amount is too little,
too much, or about right?
Subjects receive the experiment in the closing portion of the survey.1
Prior to exposure to treatment, respondents were asked about: their par-
1The amounts and percentages are approximations. The actual percentage of the
budget the US devotes to aid is under 1%. British respondents receive the 0.7% percentage
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Table 1: Preferences for Foreign Aid Spending by Treatment–
United States
Baseline Money Percent Money & Sample
Condition Only Only Percent
Too Little 7.8% 4.1% 12.3% 6.9% 7.8%
About Right 15.8 14.7 29.2 22.9 20.8
Too Much 63.6 63.0 43.4 55.8 56.4
Don’t Know 12.8 18.2 15.0 14.4 15.0
Notes: N = 1990; χ2 = 81.60, df = 9; p < 0.001
Table 2: Preferences for Foreign Aid Spending by Treatment–
Britain
Baseline Money Percent Money & Sample
Condition Only Only Percent
Too Little 8.1% 7.1% 11.2% 9.1% 8.9%
About Right 19.7 14.6 24.0 20.5 19.8
Too Much 62.5 69.5 50.4 60.2 60.5
Don’t Know 9.7 8.8 14.3 10.2 10.8
Notes: N = 1010; χ2 = 20.23, df = 9; p < 0.05
tisan identification; their position on an 11-point left-right ideology scale;
retrospective and prospective economic evaluations; the instrumental value
of foreign aid; and whether government should do more to promote income
equality. In addition to these pre-treatment attitudinal variables, our mod-
els include basic demographics—the respondents’ age, gender, and religious
status—as controls in the multivariate analyses below.2
3 Experimental Results
As seen in Table 1 and Table 2, there is majority belief that government
spends too much on foreign aid (except the “Percent Only” (PO) condition
in the US, where merely a plurality believes this). However, response distri-
butions differ significantly across treatment conditions. The most dramatic
difference occurs for the PO treatment compared to the “Baseline Condition”
(BC)—those saying “too much” is spent on aid falls from 63.6% to 43.4% in
the US and from 62.5% to 50.4% in Britain. The full set of pairwise com-
parisons across treatment groups using t-tests is presented in Table 3.
even though the actual amount of budget spent on aid is closer to 1.6% because the former
is an amount that received extensive media attention during the fielding of the survey (e.g.
Provost and Tran 2013). Some reports include military assistance as part of the aid tally.
Our treatments are meant to exclude military assistance.
2More detailed question wording, response distributions, and coding decisions appear
in the appendix.
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Table 3: Pairwise comparison t-tests of all experimental conditions
Country Condition 1: mean Condition 2: mean Difference p-value
US Baseline: 2.64 Money only: 2.72 -0.08 p <.1
US Baseline: 2.64 Percent only: 2.37 0.27 p <.01
US Baseline: 2.64 Money and Percent: 2.57 0.07 ns
US Money only: 2.72 Percent only: 2.37 0.36 p <.01
US Money only: 2.37 Money and Percent: 2.57 0.15 p <.01
US Percent only: 2.37 Money and Percent: 2.57 -0.21 p <.01
UK Baseline: 2.60 Money only: 2.68 -0.08 ns
UK Baseline: 2.60 Percent only: 2.46 0.15 p <.05
UK Baseline: 2.60 Money and Percent: 2.57 0.03 ns
UK Money only: 2.68 Percent only: 2.46 0.22 p <.01
UK Money only: 2.68 Money and Percent: 2.57 0.11 p <.1
UK Percent only: 2.46 Money and Percent: 2.57 -0.11 p <.1
Two sided p-values using unweighted data. Dependent variable coded so that 1=“Too
little”, 2=“About right”, and 3=“Too much”. Respondents who answered “Don’t know”
were recoded to missing.
Interestingly, the “Money and Percent (M&P)” treatment creates a dis-
tribution right in the middle between the “Money Only” (MO) and PO treat-
ments. In Britain, the percentage of those believing the nation spends “too
much” on overseas aid in the M&O treatment (60.2%) sits perfectly be-
tween the percentage of respondents in the MO (69.5%) and PO (50.4%)
treatments. In the US, a far greater proportion of Americans in the M&P
treatment come to see aid spending as “about right” and slightly more who
receive this frame believe the US spends “too little” on aid than in the MO
treatment (although in American the M&P treatment is quite as perfectly
between the MO and PO treatments).
4 Multivariate Analyses
To test the robustness of these findings we look at two further questions:
(A) Are the treatment effects robust to adding a select set of predictors
of support for aid? In other words, does adding other things that we know
predict support for aid “crowd out” the effect of our treatments? And (B) Do
the treatment effects work uniformly across different segments of the public?
To be more precise, we expect that the treatment effects would be greater
for the sub-group of people who are predisposed towards the benefits of aid,
the importance of redistribution, and are optimistic about their economic
situation.
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Table 4: Marginal Effects–Sources of Support for Overseas Aid–US and GB
Predictor US Model A US Model B GB Model A GB Model B
Money Treatment 0.02 -0.01 −0.09+ -0.09
Percent Treatment 0.29∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.16∗
Money & Pct. Treat 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09+ 0.003 0.02
Economic Optimism 0.08∗∗ 0.05 0.01 -0.09
Favour Redistribution 0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 0.04 0.06
Instrumentalism 0.31∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
Ideology −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
Female 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
Religious −0.05+ -0.04 0.03 0.03
Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
Democrat 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Republican -0.03 -0.04
Labour 0.02 0.01
Conservative −0.09+ -0.08
Lib. Dem. 0.07 0.08
Green 0.02 0.01
Nationalist −0.15+ −0.15+
UKIP −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
Interaction Effects
Economic Optimism
with Money -0.05 0.05
with Percent 0.15+ 0.10
with Money & Pct. 0.06 0.31∗
Redistribution
with Money 0.12 0.01
with Percent 0.20∗∗ 0.02
with Money & Pct. 0.06 -0.07
Instrumentalism
with Money -0.03 -0.03
with Percent -0.05 -0.01
with Money & Pct. -0.03 -0.04
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.001; ∗∗ = p < 0.01; ∗ = p < 0.05;+ = p < 0.10
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We run a probit model using a dichotomous dependent variable that
splits the sample into those who believe their nation spends “too much” on
foreign aid (0) and those who feel otherwise (1). As for the right hand
side of the model, we created a control variable called instrumentalism that
measures respondents’ beliefs about the instrumental value of foreign aid:
whether aid strengthens US/GB political influence and helps to prevent in-
ternational terrorism.3 Table 4 contains marginal effects from two separate
probit estimations for each country.
Model A reports the increase in probability of not believing the nation
spends “too much” on foreign aid that comes about with the single unit
change in dichotomous co-variates. Both GB and US respondents who re-
ceive the PO only treatment have a significantly higher probability of moving
away from the belief that their nation spends “too much” on aid. In the US,
receiving the PO treatment results in 29 percentage point change; only the
shift from scoring low (0) to high (1) on the instrumentalism control has a
stronger effect at making typical respondents warm towards aid spending.
In Britain, the PO treatment results in a 14 percentage point change. This
effect is outweighed only by foreign policy instrumentalism or by identifying
with UKIP or regional parties (Plaid Cymru/SNP).
Other comparisons demonstrate the power of the PO treatment. In the
US, it takes extreme changes in a respondent’s ideology (moving the full
distance of the 11 point scale from 10 [conservative] to liberal [0]) to exceed
the effect of the PO treatment. In a similar vein, a respondent has to move
from an advanced age (over 80) to a young voter just over 18 to show the
decrease in propensity to believe that America was overspending on aid that
occurs with a shift from the BC to PO treatment.
In Model B we examine the second question of whether the treatments
have differential effects on those respondents who have a more instrumental-
ist view of aid, have positive economic evaluations, and support redistribu-
tion. To do so we add interactions between these variables and the treatments
to Model A. The stand-alone marginal effect of the PO treatment remains
quite strong in the US (21%) and is slightly larger in the GB model with
interactions (16%) than in the model without (14%). What most stands
out is the fact that Americans with particular characteristics respond very
strongly to the PO treatment. On top of the 21% increase in probability in
moving away from favoring aid reductions that comes simply from receiving
the treatment, Americans who feel good about their personal finances and
receive the PO treatment see another 15% decline in their demand for aid
cuts. Americans who receive the PO treatments and believe governments
should promote income equality see an even larger 20% decline in opposition
to overseas aid.
3Full results appear in the appendix. Included covariates mirror those in vanHeerde
and Hudson (2010), Henson and Lindstrom (2012), and Paxton and Knack (2011).
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Model B for Great Britain suggests that support among all respondents
will improve if British citizens are made aware of how small of portion of bud-
get foreign aid is. However, by-and-large, there are not interactions between
the treatments and the co-variates. Unlike the US case, those favouring eco-
nomic redistribution or who are economic optimists are no more likely to be
leery of aid cuts when they receive the PO treatments.4
To summarize, we find that the treatment effects for the PO treatment
hold in both countries (Question A above). Plus, we find that an instru-
mentalist belief in the benefits of aid also makes people warm towards aid
spending. US respondents that are optimistic about their economic situation
or support redistribution are more receptive to the PO treatment. But no
such heterogeneous effects exist in the UK (Question B above).
5 Conclusion
Relative to everyday purchases, the raw amounts of foreign aid expenditures
appear enormous. Any way you slice it, “billions” is a lot of money. Our
findings suggest that these large numbers render the public cool towards
their nation’s levels of overseas aid expenditure. And those in the media
with an agenda opposed to aid further throw ice on the public mood by
noting the inefficiencies in these large expenditures.5
Results from the above experiment suggest that it is possible to shift peo-
ple’s scepticism towards aid spending by presenting the percentage of the UK
and US budgets allocated to foreign aid.6 The observed reduction in citizen
demands to cut foreign aid when only percentages of budgets are mentioned
remains after adding controls for some common correlates of foreign aid to
multivariate models.
However, it is only in the US that mentioning the low percentage spend
4The significant marginal effect for the interaction between economic optimism and
the treatment where respondents are provided with information concerning the amount
of money and percentage of the “budget” Britain spends on foreign aid is curious as the
interaction between economic optimism and the PO treatment is insignificant (as are the
two components of the interaction term on their own). We refrain from over-speculation
on this point as the size of the number of respondents who both receive the treatment and
express economic optimism is quite small (n=27) and pales in comparison to the number of
people in the affirmative category of the significant interaction between economic optimism
and the percent only treatment in the US (n=118).
5e.g. Burman and Batchelor’s (2015) discussion of how a half billion pound UK aid
project to combat malaria turned to expenditures on “wedding dresses for African brides.”
6It should be noted that public opinion and the messages citizens receive concerning aid
policies in the “real world” are “dynamic” (Chong and Druckman 2007). Sceptical media
easily can brush aside positive messages about the benefits brought about by spending
just a small percentage of the national budget on aid with another counter-frame focus-
ing on the amounts of money that end up wasted or in the pockets of corrupt officials.
Understanding the dynamic interplay of statements and rebuttals on citizen attitudes is
a necessary next step in this research area.
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in the presence of dollar amounts where we see reduced support for aid cuts
relative to the baseline or MO conditions. The cross-national difference in
the effect of the M&P treatment is not the only finding that differs across
countries. Agree-disagree responses to the two questions that comprise the
“instrumentalist” index show that Americans are more instrumentalist in
their attitudes towards aid, but the effect of instrumentalism is stronger in
the analyses that utilize respondents from the UK.
We have shown that in the US the effect of showing the percent figure
is stronger for those people who are in favour of redistribution and being
optimistic about their economic situation. However, there is no such het-
erogeneous treatment effect in Britain. This is a possible indication that
attitudes are more inflexible in Britain. Our inference is that this may well
be a function of the smaller misperceptions about the aid budget that exist
in Britain. Extrapolating this finding suggests that the treatment effect of
communicating the percent of the budget spent on aid will probably be most
effective in countries where misperceptions are largest (see Eurobarometer
2003 for comparative EU data), but it may also be the case that this works
at the individual level too. Or it may be the case that high estimates of the
budget themselves reflect underlying negative attitudes towards aid. Future
work will need to tease out the causal direction of attitudes, information,
and support.
Finally, future research should consider the means by which innumeracy
can be addressed. In the case of foreign aid, bringing public perceptions
in line with actual government outlays is valuable in and of itself, partic-
ularly in light of concerns over low levels of citizens’ knowledge and the
consequences innumeracy has for democratic representation. But the big
numbers problem—the billions spent on aid—still serves to skew judgments
on the appropriate level of aid spending. There are few remedies on hand
to address innumeracy. Wegwarth (2013) advocates national statistical lit-
eracy campaigns, but a more likely and potentially successful approach may
involve moving away from “large numbers” and towards representations that
are more intuitive for citizens with limited numeric skills. Here we have
shown that presenting foreign aid as a percentage of the national budget is
effective. Future work should explore visual as well as numerical presenta-
tions of budget information or more frequentist statements, i.e. one penny
of every dollar is spent on foreign aid (Gigerenzer and Edwards 2003).
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Appendix A Online Appendix
Appendix A.1 Response Distributions
Question wording and distributions of key co-variates and coding decisions:
1. Economic Optimism: How does the financial situation of your house-
hold now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Has it:
Response US GB
Gotten a lot better 5.1% 1.9%
Gotten a little better 19.1 10.1
Stayed the same 35.9 36.5
Gotten a little worse 23.5 36.4
Gotten a lot worse 15.0 13.3
Don’t know 1.5 1.8
Note: Those responding ‘Gotten a lot better’ or ‘Gotten a little better’ coded
‘1’ for the multivariate estimations and ‘0’ otherwise.
2. Redistribution: Distribution of respondents on a 7-point scale where
1 equals “Government should get out of the business of promoting income
equality” and 7 equals “Government should do more to reduce income equal-
ity”
Response US GB
Government Should Get Out 33.1% 10.1%
2 7.9 7.6
3 5.8 11.2
4 17.2 24.6
5 10.4 13.1
6 9.2 11.9
Government Should Do More 16.4 21.5
Note: For the dichotomous variable used in the multivariate analyses, a
respondent’s score is ‘1’ on the Redistribution variable if they provide a
response to this question that is above the sample median, which in both
countries is “4”, and ‘0’ otherwise.
3. Instrumentalism: Two questions combine to determine whether a
respondent holds instrumentalist views concerning providing aid. The two
questions are a) US/UK aid to developing countries strengthens our political
influence in the world; and b) US/UK aid to developing countries helps to
prevent international terrorism. Response distributions are as follows:
4. Ideology and Partisanship: In the multivariate analyses, an 11-point
ideology scale captures respondents’ left to right self placement (with higher
scores indicating a more rightward self-placement). The mean and median
ideology value in the US is 5.6 and 5, respectively. In GB, it is 5.0 and
Response US GB
Question: Strengthens Prevents Strengthens Prevents
Influence Terrorism Influence Terrorism
Strongly Agree 7.0% 5.5% 2.9% 2.5%
Agree 31.1 20.4 24.2 17.7
Neither or Don’t Know 32.5 33.2 34.5 33.3
Disagree 17.2 22.0 24.8 28.2
Strongly Disagree 12.2 18.9 13.6 18.3
Note: In both nations, the two items scale together well (US: α = 0.77; GB: α = 0.77),
and an additive index of responses to the two variables yields a scale ranging from 2-10.
In the multivariate analyses, “Instrumentalists” are those who score above the combined
median index score of 6, and receive a score of ‘1’. Non-instrumentalists receive a score
of ‘0’.
5. 33.3% and 28.1% of the US sample thinks of themselves as Democrats
and Republicans, respectively. In Britain, the distribution of partisan iden-
tification is as follows: 31.4% Labour, 25.4% Conservative; 8.0% Liberal
Democrat; 5.6% UKIP; 4.2% Green; 2.7% Nationalist (SNP/Plaid Cyrmu).
5. Other Demographics: For GB, 52.9% of the sample is female and the
mean age is 52.7 (median (54)). For the US, 53.5% of the sample is female
and the mean age is 53.0 (median (54)). In Britain, 47.6% of those sampled
identifies with a religious denomination. The comparable number in the US
is 71.7%.
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Appendix A.2 Full Probit Analyses
Table A1: Probit Coefficients
Predictor US A US B GB A GB B
Money Treatment 0.05 -0.01 −0.25+ -0.25
(0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21)
Percent Treatment 0.74∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.41∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19)
Money & Pct. Treat 0.31∗∗∗ 0.24+ 0.01 0.05
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20)
Economic Optimism 0.21∗∗ 0.12 0.03 -0.26
(0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.31)
Favour Redistribution 0.28∗∗∗ 0.07 0.12 0.15
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.19)
Instrumentalism 0.79∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.22)
Ideology −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Female 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Religious −0.12+ -0.11 0.08 0.07
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Democrat 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Republican -0.08 -0.09
(0.09) (0.09)
Labour 0.04 0.04
(0.13) (0.13)
Conservative -0.24 -0.23
(0.15) (0.15)
Lib. Dem. 0.18 0.22
(0.15) (0.18)
Green 0.04 0.03
(0.25) (0.25)
Nationalist -0.44 -0.43
(0.28) (0.28)
UKIP −0.80∗∗ −0.80∗∗
(0.27) (0.27)
Interaction Effects
Economic Optimism
with Money -0.12 0.12
(0.22) (0.43)
with Percent 0.38+ 0.25
(0.22) (0.39)
with Money & Pct. 0.15 0.80+
0.20 (0.43)
Redistribution
with Money 0.31 0.02
(0.20) (0.27)
with Percent 0.52∗ -0.05
(0.20) (0.26)
with Money & Pct. 0.15 -0.20
(0.19) (0.26)
Instrumentalism
with Money -0.07 -0.07
(0.20) (0.31)
with Percent -0.12 -0.31
(0.20) (0.30)
with Money & Pct. -0.08 -0.11
(0.18) (0.30)
Fit Statistics
χ2 540.6 (df=13) 544.2 (df=22) 283.6 (df=16) 303.0 (df=25)
McFadden R2 0.238 0.243 0.269 0.274
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.001; ∗∗ = p < 0.01; ∗ = p < 0.05; + = p < 0.10
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Appendix A.3 Robustness Checks for Multivariate Analyses
Table A2: Marginal Effects–No Control for Instrumentalism
Predictor US A US B UK A UK B
Money Treatment 0.02 -0.02 −0.05 -0.05
Percent Treatment 0.27∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.15∗
Money & Pct. Treat 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.03 0.04
Economic Optimism 0.12∗∗ 0.08 -0.06 -0.08
Favour Redistribution 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10+ 0.09∗ 0.12+
Ideology −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
Female 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Religious -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.03
Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
Democrat 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Republican -0.03 -0.03
Labour 0.05 0.05
Conservative -0.04 -0.04
Lib. Dem. 0.13+ 0.14∗
Green 0.03 0.03
Nationalist -0.11 -0.11
UKIP −0.26∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
Interaction Effects
Economic Optimism
with Money -0.03 0.12
with Percent 0.15+ 0.11
with Money & Pct. 0.03 0.38∗∗
Redistribution
with Money 0.10 -0.04
with Percent 0.17∗ -0.01
with Money & Pct. 0.03 -0.09
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.001; ∗∗ = p < 0.01; ∗ = p < 0.05;+ = p < 0.10
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